Israel-Palestine: Is Peace Possible On Obama’s Watch?
Netanyahu knows there are no circumstances in which the Palestinians (leadership and people) would recognise Israel as a Jewish state and that, of course, is precisely why he is demanding that they must. In other words, he knows his demand will make an agreement with the Palestinians impossible and he is hoping that Palestinian rejection will enable him to get away with blaming Palestinian “President” Abbas and his leadership colleagues for the failure of Kerry’s mission.
On the subject of the Palestinian right of return, Liberman (who has hopes of replacing Netanyahu as prime minister) said, “I will not sign any agreement that includes any right of return into Israel, not even a single (Palestinian) person.”
On its own limiting the Palestinian right of return would not be an obstacle to peace IF the land to be returned to was a Palestinian state formed by a complete end to Israeli occupation of the West Bank with East Jerusalem its capital (or the whole of Jerusalem an undivided, open city and the capital of two states). And here’s why.
Way back in 1979 when the PNC (the Palestine National Council and then the highest decision making body on the Palestinian side) overwhelming approved Arafat’s two-state policy of politics and compromise with Israel, it was accepted in the name of pragmatism that the return would have to be limited to the Palestinian mini state. Though they could not say so in public unless and until they had something concrete to show for their willingness to face the reality of Israel’s existence in more or less its pre-1967 borders, Arafat and his senior leadership colleagues had calculated what this would mean in terms of the number of Palestinians who would be able to return. They told me in private that the number would probably be not more than 100,000 and that the rest would have to settle for financial compensation.
Arafat and the 296 of 300 PNC delegates who voted for what had previously been unthinkable compromise with Israel were fully aware that by agreeing to limit the right of return in the name of pragmatism they would be laying themselves open to a charge of betraying the Palestinian diaspora if and when their decision became public. I discussed this in some depth with Arafat at the time and his view, simply stated, was that it was better for the Palestinians, the occupied and oppressed most of all, to have some justice rather than none at all. As I have indicated in previous articles, it was also his hope that one or two generations of a two-state peace would lead by mutual consent to one state for all, creating a situation in which more Palestinians could return.
On the subject of the Palestinian right of return I think the pragmatism Arafat represented still applies but it won’t have the opportunity to manifest itself without a complete end to Israel’s occupation to make the space for a viable Palestinian state.
From time to time in recent weeks I have asked myself what, really, is driving Kerry. Is he powered by an Obama command along the lines of “Go to the outer limits of what is politically possible for us to do for peace”, or is there something else?
Meir Dagan has speculated that Kerry’s apparently inexhaustible commitment to an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal is “motivated by his presidential hopes for 2016.” If that is so his calculation would be that Kerry the peacemaker not Hillary Clinton would be the Democratic frontrunner for the next race to the White House, a race it seems the Democrats are likely to win because of the divisions in the Republican Party.
In that context I think Hillary has no reason to be concerned because it seems that the day is coming when Kerry will have to admit that his optimism about his ability to “narrow the gaps” between what Netanyahu is demanding and Abbas can accept was not justified. (My guess is that Hillary will not volunteer for the race to the White House but will wait to be begged to run by her fan base within the Democratic Party).
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