Changing the Israeli mindset… Is it really possible?
Formally known as the Arab Peace Initiative (API), it was first presented on 27 March 2002 at the Beirut Summit of the Arab League by then Crown Prince and today King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. (Arafat was unable to attend the summit because Sharon’s government told him that if he left the occupied West Bank he would not be allowed to return). The API has since be re-endorsed by Arab leaders on a number of occasions.
What’s in the API for Israel?
An end to the conflict and with the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement the establishment of normal relations between Israel and the entire Arab world (and also, although the API does not say so, the establishment of normal relations between Israel and the entire Muslim world including Iran).
What does Israel have to do to secure this deal?
It has to end its occupation of all Arab land (including the Syrian Golan Heights) grabbed in 1967. It has to accept the establishment of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem its capital. And it has to agree to a just solution of the Palestinian refugee problem in accordance with UN General Assembly resolution 194 of 11 December 1948.
This resolution states that “the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest possible date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for the loss or damage of property which, under principles of international or in equity, should be made good by the governments or authorities responsible.”
One of several given reasons for the instant, knee-jerk rejection by Israel’s leaders of the API when it was first presented was that the return of Palestinian refugees would swamp the “Jewish state” and turn it into an Arab state. From Zionism’s pathological perspective that fear was well grounded, but…… If Israel’s leaders had been interested in peace on terms other than their own, terms which require a Palestinian surrender to Zionism’s will, they could have discovered through back-channel exploration that the API was open to negotiation so far as Arab leaders were concerned. Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, subsequently said so.
In particular Israel’s leaders could have discovered that if they engaged in good faith negotiations for a comprehensive peace arising out of the API, the Arabs would effectively endorse Arafat’s pragmatism by accepting that the return of Palestinian refugees would have to be restricted to the territory of the Palestinian state – not Israel inside its borders as they were on 4 June 1967.
As I have pointed out in previous articles, Arafat was well aware that if his pragmatism on the matter of the return of the refugees had become public while he was preparing the ground on his side for peace, he would have been accused by some Palestinians of betraying their cause. When I discussed this with Arafat he made two comments. One was to the effect that it was better for the Palestinians to have “some justice rather than none.” The other was an expression of his hope that a two-state peace might lead eventually to a one-state by mutual consent. So he did not regard his compromise on the return of the refugees as necessarily closing that door for ever.
The other thing Israel’s leaders could have discovered about the flexibility of the API is that its requirement for East Jerusalem to be the capital of the Palestinian state is not a take it or leave it option. If Israel’s leaders were prepared to negotiate for a real peace, Arab leaders would be very open to the idea that Jerusalem should be an undivided, open city and the capital of two states.
To sum up so far: In return for an end to its occupation of all Arab land grabbed in 1967 (in a war of Israeli aggression not self-defense) the API offered and still offers Israel a comprehensive peace with the governments and therefore the vast majority of the peoples of the entire Arab and wider Muslim world. (Within that context it’s reasonable to assume that violent Islamic fundamentalism in all its manifestations could be isolated, contained and defeated).
The main reason why Israel’s leaders are not under any internal pressure to take the API seriously is, as indicated by public opinion polls, that the vast majority of (Jewish) Israelis have not been informed about it.
That being so the question arising is this.
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