Palestine and Zioinism The Whole Truth
When Kissinger realised that Israel’s generals were going to pursue the war to the point of totally humiliating Sadat and himself he went to Moscow. The outcome of that visit was a statement that American forces around the world had been placed on a Red (Nuclear) Alert because of the danger that the Soviet Union would become engaged in the war to prevent Sadat being totally defeated and humiliated. Prime Minister Golda Meir then received urgent appeals from Kissinger and Nixon. They told her she had to bring Sharon under control – he was intending to wipe out the trapped Third Egyptian Army – in order to prevent World War III and a nuclear holocaust.
And that was enough to cause her to act.
In her last conversation with me a few months before she died, Golda put it this way.
QUOTE
Still in my slippers, I climbed into a helicopter. I flew to Egypt – imagine that, Golda Meir in Egypt – and there I confronted Sharon. I stood in front of him and I said, “I am your Prime Minister and I order you not to move against the Third Army.”
UNQUOTE
And that, more or less, was how the 1973 war ended. The trapped Third Egyptian Army was saved and with it Sadat’s face. And that left Kissinger with enough, just about enough, to begin the process that would lead to Egypt’s separate peace with Israel. Kissinger knew that if Egypt could be taken out of the war equation the Arabs would never be able to confront Israel militarily.
As a verbal footnote I’ll add this. In that last conversation with Golda I asked her if she had believed that the threat of Soviet intervention and a superpower confrontation was real. She said that at the time she did believe it was.. “Do you still think so?” I asked. The length of her pause for thought suggested it was not a question she had previously considered. Eventually she said, “I’m not sure.” I took that to mean that she was open to the idea that Kissinger and the Soviets had put on a warning show to frighten her into confronting Sharon.
In that same conversation I asked Golda how much she had trusted Kissinger. She gave me two answers.
One was a gesture. She opened the index finger and thumb of her left hand to the widest possible extent, forming a complete right angle. Then, slowly, she lowered the index finger until it was just about touching her thumb. Then she said, “That much!”
Her second answer was this.
QUOTE
Whenever Kissinger was here in Israel he always called my cabinet ministers by their first names. And they called him Henry. Not me. I always called him Mr. Secretary of State or Dr. Kissinger; and I insisted that he called me Madame Prime Minister or Mrs. Meir. If you’re on first name terms with such a man you’ll get screwed.
UNQUOTE
In summary of what I’ve said about the wars of 1948, 1967and 1973 I’ll repeat that Israel’s existence has never, ever, been in danger from any combination of Arab force.
I’ll add here a comment made to me in 1980 by then retired Major General Shlomo Gazit, the best and the brightest of Israel’s Directors of Military Intelligence. At the time I was acting as the linkman in a secret, exploratory dialogue between Arafat and Shimon Peres who was hoping to win Israel’s next election and deny Begin a second term in office. Gazit was one of two who were advising Peres for this initiative. Over coffee one morning I said to him, “I’ve come to the conclusion that it’s all a myth. Israel’s existence has never, ever, been in danger.” Through a sad smile he replied: “Alan, the trouble with us Israelis is that we’ve become the victims of our own propaganda
The THIRD of Zionism’s biggest propaganda lies is its assertion that it has never had a Palestinian partner for peace.
The truth is that nobody, repeat nobody, did more than PLO leader Yasser Arafat to prepare the ground for peace on terms which any rational government in Israel would have accepted with relief.
As I documented in detail in my book Arafat: Terrorist or Peacemaker? (I spent a year living with him and his most senior leadership colleagues to talk their story out of them), Arafat became a pragmatist as the result of a conversation he had with Egypt’s President Nasser in 1969. Nasser told him that if the PLO wanted to be taken seriously by the major powers it would have to come up with a policy politics and compromise. The compromise required, Nasser added, was a commitment to peace with an Israel inside its 1967 borders.
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