Israel’s attack on the USS Liberty – The full story
“If reported bombardment correct, we would presume it prelude to military action against Syrian positions on Syrian soil. Such a development, following on heels Israeli acceptance cease-fire resolution would cast doubts on Israeli intentions and create gravest problems for [U.S. government] representatives in Arab countries. You should stress we must at all costs have complete cessation Israeli military action except in cases where clearly some replying fire is necessary in self-defence.”
After making his representation as instructed, Ambassador Barbour sought to defend the IDF’s softening up of Syria’s positions by reminding Rusk that Syria had not yet accepted the Security Council’s demand for a cease-fire (as, I add, Jordan and Egypt had actually done and Israel had falsely claimed to have done). It was true that the Syrians were still shooting from fixed positions in their own territory – but in response to the IDF’s bombardment; and, also, because Syria’s leaders were putting on a token show, to enable them to score points against Nasser in the Arab world by claiming that they had held out longer than him. The Johnson administration knew the Syrian regime had honoured its secret pre-war deal with Israel by not advancing its land forces from their defensive positions, so when Rusk flashed instructions to Barbour he knew that the Syrian army posed no threat to Israel.
In reality any hope the Johnson administration had of stopping the Israelis had been destroyed by their attack on the Liberty.
That evening, Thursday 8 June, Nasser intervened to stop the Syrians – in the hope of stopping the Israelis. The Egyptian President sent the following message to his Syrian counterpart, Nur ed-Din al Atassi: “I believe that Israel is about to concentrate all of its forces against Syria in order to destroy the Syrian army and regard for the common cause obliges me to advise you to agree to the ending of hostilities and to inform U Thant immediately, in order to preserve Syria’s great army. We have lost this battle.”
The message ended:
“May God help us in the future. Your brother, Gamal Abdul Nasser.”
That Nasser message, no doubt like all others, was intercepted by Israeli military intelligence. In the margin of a copy of it, Dayan scribbled the following note:
“Eshkol,
1. In my opinion this cable obliges us to capture maximal military lines.
2. Yesterday I did not think Egypt and Syria would collapse in this way and give up the continuation of the campaign. But since this is the situation, it must be exploited to the full.
A great day. Moshe Dayan.”
The Syrian leadership took Nasser’s advice and announced its acceptance of the cease-fire. It came into effect at 0520 hours the following morning, Friday 9 June. So far as the Arabs and the organised international community represented by the UN were concerned, the war was over.
Six hours and ten minutes later, the IDF invaded Syria.
Dayan had postponed the attack to allow for the redeployment of IDF units from Sinai and the West Bank – a redeployment that could not be completed while the Liberty was capable of listening to IDF movement orders.
Contrary to Dayan’s expectations and his prediction to the IDF’s northern commander, General David (“Dado”) Elazar, who had never been less than gung-ho for war with Syria, the Syrians fought well. Apart from honour – the eyes of the Arab world were upon them – there were probably two reasons why they did so. The Golan Heights were thought to be impregnable and they felt secure in their bunkers and fox holes. But when Israeli paratroops and armour were landed behind them, they were effectively cut-off, with nowhere to run; they had to fight or die. Because the IDF had an audacious enough plan to capture the Golan Heights, they became less of an impregnable fortress for their Syrian defenders and more of a death-trap.
On Friday 9 June 1967, and for the best part of 24 hours, the Syrians fought with all their strength, and there were great and true acts of courage under fire on both sides, not least on the part of those IDF officers who led their men into the jaws of certain death that the bunkers and fox-holes of the Golan Heights were. But by the evening of Saturday 10 June, in defiance of what had been agreed secretly with the Johnson administration before the war, the Golan Heights were in Israel’s hands. The war was over. In six days the creation of Greater Israel was a fait accompli. Dayan had made Zionism’s mad dream come true.
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